Abstract-We study a zero-sum game formulation of a dynamic vehicle routing problem: a system planner seeks to design dynamic routing policies for a team of vehicles to minimize the average waiting time of demands that are strategically placed in a region by an adversarial agent with unitary capacity operating from a depot. We characterize an equilibrium in the limiting case where vehicles travel arbitrarily slower than the agent (heavy load). We show that such an equilibrium consists of a routing policy based on performing successive TSP tours through outstanding demands and a unique power-law spatial density centered at the depot location.
I. INTRODUCTION
In the recent past, considerable efforts have been devoted to the study of dynamic vehicle routing problems, where the objective is to cooperatively assign and schedule demands among a team of vehicles for service requests that are realized in a dynamic fashion over a region of interest [1] , [2] . Throughout the existing literature, demands are assumed to be generated over time by an exogenous process that is unaffected by the routing policies, and in particular is non-adversarial [3] . However, there are many scenarios (e.g. surveillance missions) where there is an inherent conflict of interest between the process generating demands and the system planner designing routing policies. Moreover, even in non-adversarial scenarios the system planner may not have perfect information about the underlying process generating demands and a study of strategic dynamic vehicle routing can add insight into policies that are robust with respect to such uncertainty. To the best of our knowledge, settings with these characteristics have not yet been studied.
In this paper, we consider the following problem: a system planner seeks to design dynamic routing policies for a team of vehicles that minimize the average waiting time of a typical demand, defined as the time difference between the moment the demand is placed in the region until its location is visited by a vehicle; while an adversarial agent with unitary capacity operating from a depot, aims at the opposite, strategically choosing the spatio-temporal stochastic process of demands. A novel feature of this setup is that, since demand generation is tied to the motion of the agent, there is a dependence between the spatial and temporal component of the demand generation process: the point process is thus completely specified by the spatial distribution. This is in stark contrast with the conventional setup for dynamic
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vehicle routing problems, where the spatial and temporal components of the demand generation process are typically assumed to be independent. We model the problem as a zero-sum game with two players: the system planner and the adversarial agent, with the average system time being the utility function. In the limiting regime where vehicles travel arbitrarily slower than the adversarial agent, we show that the game has a finite value and we characterize an equilibrium (or saddle point) of the game. This saddle point is shown to consist of a routing policy based on performing successive traveling salesperson (TSP) tours through outstanding demands and a unique power-law spatial density centered at the depot location. The saddle point routing policy is the one proposed in [2] , where it is shown to be optimal for the setup where the demands are generated by an arbitrary spatio-temporal renewal process with a very high arrival rate. In order to rigorously determine the saddle point spatial distribution for the adversary we rely on Fenchel (conjugate) duality [4] and results from [5] , [6] concerning the maximization of concave integral functionals subject to linear equality constraints. Such mathematical tools could also be brought to bear on the study of dynamic vehicle routing with partial information about demand generation, where the goal is to design routing policies with performance guarantees under worst case scenarios.
II. MATHEMATICAL PRELIMINARIES

A. Basic Concepts and Notation
We introduce some basic concepts from convex analysis, as found in [7] . The epigraph of an extended real-valued function f :
its effective domain is defined as dom f = {x ∈ X : f (x) < ∞}. We say that the function f is proper if f (x) < +∞ for at least one x ∈ X and f (x) > −∞ for all x ∈ X; and f is said to be closed, if its epigraph is a closed set. A proper convex function f : R → (−∞, +∞] is said to be: essentially strictly convex if f is strictly convex on dom f ; and essentially smooth if f is differentiable on the interior of dom f and f ′ (x k ) → ∞ for any sequence {x k } in the interior of dom f such that x k → x with x in the boundary of dom f . Given a set X ⊆ R n , we define its indicator function δ :
Let S ∈ R n be a finite Lebesgue measure set, and let h : R → R be a closed proper convex function. Consider the (convex) functional I : L 1 (S) → [−∞, +∞] defined as in [8] by
Now, consider the following optimization problem:
where b ∈ R n and A :
Problem (4) is amenable to solution through Fenchel duality. Let V = L 1 (S) and V ⋆ = L ∞ (S), then it is possible to define a bilinear product on V × V ⋆ by,
As the following result [9] shows, to compute the convex conjugate of the integral functional (3) with the bilinear product defined in (6), we may just conjugate the integrand.
Proposition 1: Let S be a finite measure set in R n , and let V and V ⋆ be as above with bilinear product given by (6) . Then, for any ϕ ⋆ ∈ V ⋆ , we have
A direct application of Theorem 1 and Proposition 1, with f := I and g(Aϕ) := −δ(Aϕ − b|0), yields the next result.
Corollary 1: Consider the problem (primal) defined by (4) and (5) , and assume that the constraint qualification
holds. Then, (4) is equal to the dual problem
where
Moreover, the supremum on the righthand side of (9) is attained by some ξ * whenever finite. The following proposition gives sufficient conditions for the uniqueness of the multiplier ξ * .
Proposition 2: If the set of constraint functions
is linearly independent and h ⋆ is essentially strictly convex, then the optimal dual solution is unique.
We now state the chief result in [5] . 
Then, the primal optimal solution is given by,
where ξ * ∈ R n is the dual optimal solution.
III. PROBLEM DESCRIPTION
Consider a bounded set S ⊆ R 2 with µ(S) > 0, where µ(·) is the usual Lebesgue measure. Assume S has a smooth boundary, i.e., for every x in the closure S there exists a ball B centered at x, such that µ(B ∩ S) > 0. An infinite number of targets/demands are stored in a depot located, without loss of generality, at the origin 0. Targets are picked up from the depot, carried and dropped in S by an adversarial agent traveling in straight lines at unit speed. The placement locations are sampled independently from a spatial density ϕ : S → R + . We assume that the agent has unitary target carrying capacity, i.e., he returns to the depot in between placing successive targets, and once at the depot he spends an average time τ > 0 1 .The rate at which demands are placed in S is thus given by
where X ∈ S denotes the location of an arbitrary demand.
From (12) we observe that the demand generation stochastic process is completely specified by the spatial density ϕ. In particular, in order to sustain a higher rate, the density has to be more concentrated around 0. This dependence between the temporal rate and spatial density of demands is a novel feature in our formulation as compared to conventional setup for dynamical vehicle routing problems, where the temporal and spatial components of the demand point process are typically assumed to be independent. Demands have to be serviced by m vehicles traveling at speed v. In order to service a target, vehicles have to physically travel to the location of the target; we assume that the on-site service time is zero. Let Π denote the class of spatially unbiased 2 and stable policies, as defined in [2] , and let F = ϕ : S → R + s.t. S ϕ(x)dx = 1 be the set of spatial probability distributions with support over S. Given that the agent is placing targets according to a distribution ϕ ∈ F and the system planner is implementing the routing policy π ∈ Π, let T i (π, ϕ) represent the time elapsed from the moment the agent places i-th demand at its location until a vehicle reaches its location. Define the system time
We focus on the heavy load regime, λ/v → ∞. However, in this setup the target generation rate, as given by (12), is intertwined with the spatial density ϕ; therefore, we perform our analysis for the limiting case v → 0 + . In the context described above, we consider a two-player complete information zero-sum game between the system planner seeking to design routing policies for the team of vehicles and the adversarial agent placing demands, with the system time defined in (13) as the utility function. In other words, in this strictly competitive setting, the agent will seek to maximize the system time, while the goal of the system planner is exactly the opposite. A solution, or equilibrium, of the game will be a pair (π * , ϕ * ) ∈ Π × F for which
A pair (π * , ϕ * ) satisfying condition (14) is called a saddle point for the function T . In this paper, we are interested in characterizing one such saddle point.
IV. AN OPTIMAL ROUTING POLICY
Unbiased TSP-based Routing Policy π * : Let r be a large enough positive integer. From a central point in S partition S into r sets S 1 , . . . , S r , such that S k ϕ(x)dx = 1/r. Within each set of the partition, form sets of demands with size n/r, and as these sets are constructed, deposit them in a queue and service them in a "first come, first served" fashion with the first available vehicle. The service of each set is achieved by constructing a TSP tour. Finally, optimize over n. 2 The case for spatially biased stable policies follows along similar lines.
It was shown in [2] that in the limit as λ/v → +∞,
for any π ∈ Π and ϕ ∈ F , where β is a constant that appears in the asymptotic result for the length of the shortest path in the Traveling Salesman Problem (TSP) over the Euclidean plane [10] . Moreover, it was proved in [11] that inf π∈Π T (π, ϕ) = T (π * , ϕ) for all ϕ ∈ F . Hence,
where the last inequality follows from the min-max inequality, which holds true on any product space (see e.g. [7] ). Since by definition inf π∈Π sup ϕ∈F T (π, ϕ) ≤ sup ϕ∈F T (π * , ϕ), we arrive at
Therefore, if there exists a ϕ * ∈ F such that T (π * , ϕ * ) = sup ϕ∈F T (π * , ϕ), then it would constitute, together with π * , a saddle point of T as v → 0 + . The next section is devoted to finding such ϕ * .
V. THE SADDLE POINT SPATIAL DENSITY
The optimal spatial density that will maximize the system time as v → 0 when the routing policy is π * will emerge as the solution to the following optimization problem:
In its original form, problem (16) is the product of a convex and a concave function. Hence, it is not convex thus hard to tackle. However, applying a logarithmic transformation to the objective function yields the following equivalent formulation (12) it can be easily seen that
Now expressing the dependence of ϕ on the real variable γ allows us to rewrite (17) as
Problem (19) decouples the spatio-temporal dependence of the stochastic process of demand locations, splitting (16) into two connected sub-problems: one for the spatial component, and another one for the temporal component. The former entails a maximization over an infinite-dimensional space to determine an optimal parametric family of spatial probability densities, parametrized by γ; the latter is a scalar maximization which yields the optimal rate, therefore completely identifying the optimal density from the previously found parametric family, rendering the solution to (16) and the saddle point density for the game.
A. The Optimal Parametric Family
Given γ ∈ Γ, we wish to solve
or equivalently,
First let us note that, as stated by the following lemma, problem (21) is feasible for every γ ∈ Γ and has a value of zero when γ lies at the boundary of Γ in (18).
Lemma 2: For all γ ∈ int Γ there exists ϕ ∈ F γ ; if γ belongs to the boundary of Γ then the value of (21) is zero.
Proof: Let y ∈ A = {x ∈ S : x ∈ arg max x x }, and note that µ(A) = 0. By the smoothness of S, there exist balls B and B ′ centered at 0 and y with radius r and r ′ , such that µ(B ∩ S) > 0 and µ(B ′ ∩ S) > 0. Let ϕ r and ϕ r ′ denote the densities associated with uniform distributions with support over B and B ′ , respectively. Then, lim r→0 E ϕr [ X ] = 0 and lim r ′ →0 E ϕ r ′ [ X ] = max x∈S x . Note these limiting values will only be achieved by singular distributions with supports over {0} and A; therefore, the integral in (21) is zero for γ on the boundary of Γ defined in (18). Now consider a density ϕ defined as a linear combination of ϕ r and ϕ r ′ , with support over B ∪ B ′ . Then, by the linearity of the expectation we get for every α ∈ [0, 1],
Thus, given γ ∈ Γ with appropriate choices of r, r ′ and α we can always construct a density ϕ ∈ F γ . Define the continuous linear map A : L 1 (S) → R 2 with linearly independent components given by,
and let b γ ∈ R 2 be the column vector 1,
. Then, expressing the constraints that define F γ in (20) in terms of A and b γ , we can rewrite problem (21) as
Since the objective function is convex in ϕ and the equality constraints defining F γ are linear, problem (21) is convex thus amenable to solution through Lagrange duality. The Lagrangian for this problem is the function L : 
L(ϕ, ξ).
For the minimization over ϕ one might be tempted to differentiate the Lagrangian (in the Fréchet sense [12] ); however, the Lagrangian is nowhere differentiable since the positive cone {ϕ ∈ L 1 (S) : ϕ ≥ 0} has empty interior and its complement is dense in L 1 (S). As a result, this approach cannot be rigorously justified (see [5] for further discussions). To bypass this technical difficulty we will cast problem (21) under the conjugate duality framework presented in Section II-C. Defining the function
we can further rewrite (23) as
(25) Note that the integrand h is closed, proper and convex; consequently, formulation (25) exhibits the same structure as (4) , and the results in Section II-C are applicable. The next conjugate duality theorem will be of great significance in the subsequent analysis. It determines the dual of (25) and states that the duality gap is zero. Before we formally state and prove the theorem, we need the following key lemma.
Lemma 3:
and since dom I + ⊆ {ϕ ∈ L 1 (S) : ϕ ≥ 0}, it follows from Lemma 1 that ri (Adom I + ) = {d ∈ R 2 : d > 0}. The fact that b γ > 0 yields the claimed result.
Theorem 3: Let Γ be defined as in (18) , and let int Γ denote its interior. Then, for every γ ∈ int Γ the dual of problem (25) is given by
(26) admits a unique solution ξ * (γ), and the optimal value achieved is finite and equal to the infimum in (25).
Proof: The dual of problem (25) is given by,
and since the conjugate of the integrand function h defined in (24) is,
by Proposition 1 it must be equal to
From Lemma 3 it follows that for every γ ∈ int Γ the constraint qualification (8) is satisfied, and Corollary 1 implies that (26) is equal to (25) (thus equal to (21)).
Over the set
that describes the maximization space in the dual problem, we must have ξ, b γ < 0. To see this, consider an arbitrary γ ∈ int Γ and let ϕ be a density with support over S such that Aϕ = b γ , whose existence is guaranteed by Lemma 2. Then, for every x ∈ S we have ϕ(x)(ξ 1 + ξ 2 x ) < 0; hence, ξ, b γ < 0. Therefore, the dual optimal value is bounded above by zero; thus it must be achieved at some ξ * (γ). Finally, the fact that h ⋆ is essentially strictly convex (it is strictly convex over its effective domain) and the set of functions {1, x } that define A is linearly independent, implies through Proposition 2, that ξ * (γ) is unique for every γ ∈ int Γ.
Corollary 2: ξ *
Hence, letting x = 0 renders the result.
Based on the preceding theorem, the following proposition characterizes the unique optimal parametric family of spatial densities.
Proposition 3: Consider the optimization problem defined by (21) and (20) . Then, for every γ ∈ int Γ the unique optimal solution is given by,
The function h defined in (24) is both essentially strictly convex and essentially smooth. Indeed, it is strictly convex and differentiable when restricted to its effective domain [0, ∞), and |h ′ (x)| = x −3/2 which tends to ∞ as x → 0. Moreover, h satisfies the growth condition (10) since ∆ = 0 > ess sup x∈S A T ξ * (x). Then, invoking Theorem 2 we conclude that for every γ ∈ int Γ, the optimal solution to (21) is given by ϕ *
) for all x ∈ S, where ξ * (γ) is the unique dual solution determined by Theorem 3. Finally, from (27) we have that (h ⋆ ) ′ (x) = 1/4x 2 for all x < 0, and we thus arrive at (29).
Remarks:
• Through the use of conjugate duality we have transformed the infinite-dimensional optimization problem (21) into a maximization of a strictly concave function over a convex set in R 2 , and although the unique solution to (26) cannot be expressed in closed form it can be efficiently found numerically.
• The solution ϕ * γ (x) belongs to C(S), the set of continuous functions with support over S which is dense in L 1 (S) and has a positive cone with non-empty interior. We could have chosen C(S) as the underlying working space and solve (21) through differentiation of the Lagrangian; however, the uniqueness result obtained for L 1 (S) is much stronger.
B. The Optimal Parameter
We now study the optimization over γ in (19), and show that there exists a unique solution γ * . Since for every γ ∈ int Γ the dual optimum ξ * (γ) is unique, γ * will determine the unique spatial density ϕ * := ϕ * γ * from the family described in (29) that attains the maximum in (16). We start by providing some results concerning the behavior of ξ * as a function of γ ∈ int Γ, that will play a key role in establishing the existence and uniqueness of the solution to (19). Specifically, Proposition 4: Consider the dual problem defined in (26) . Then, the function ξ * : int Γ → M is differentiable, and (28) is open, therefore the following first order condition must be satisfied at ξ * :
(30) implicitly defines ξ * (γ) with Jacobian
∂ξ 2 , which is negative definite for every ξ ∈ M because of the strict convexity of I ⋆ + (strictly convex function composed with a linear function). Thus, it is nonsingular and the implicit function theorem furnishes the differentiability of ξ * (γ). Moreover,
The inverse of the Hessian of I 
and so (ξ * 2 ) ′ < 0. Finally, since for every γ ∈ int Γ we have,
it follows that D is differentiable and
the second term vanishes due to (30). The next theorem in conjunction with Proposition 3 completely characterizes the unique optimal spatial density, solution to problem (16).
Theorem 4: The optimization problem defined by (19) and (18) admits a unique optimal solution γ * ∈ int Γ. Proof: Let Ψ(γ) = γ + 2 log F (γ) denote the objective function in (19) with F (γ) := sup ϕ∈Fγ S ϕ(x)dx, for all γ ∈ Γ. Note that from Theorem 3, F (γ) = −D(γ) over int Γ. Also, Ψ is continuous and Ψ(γ) = −∞ when γ is at the boundary of the interval Γ, as implied by Proposition 4 and Lemma 2. Hence, dom Ψ = int Γ and we can find η such that {γ ∈ dom Ψ : Ψ(γ) ≥ η} is nonempty and bounded. Therefore by Weierstrass theorem [7] the set of maxima Γ * is nonempty and compact; moreover, Γ * ⊆ int Γ. For every γ * ∈ Γ * note that since γ * is an interior point of Γ, the following first order condition must be satisfied:
Combining Theorem 3 with Proposition 4, we get
Also, Proposition 3 leads to
, for all γ ∈ int Γ, which implies that D(γ) = 2 ξ * (γ), b γ . Thus, returning to (32) and after some simple algebra we conclude that every γ * ∈ Γ * must satisfy
where τ > 0. LetΓ = {γ ∈ int Γ : ξ * 2 (γ) < 0}, and note from Corollary 2 that Γ * ⊆Γ. From Proposition 4 it follows that ξ * 2 is continuous, thusΓ is an open set. Inside this set, (ξ *
)
′ (γ) < 0 and by Proposition 3 it is clear that ξ * 1 should be increasing so that the density defined in (29) integrates to unity over S. Hence, returning to (33) we conclude that the maximizer γ * has to be unique.
Corollary 3: The solution to (16) can be written as
where K > 0 is a normalization constant. Proof: Plug (33) in (29), and K = (τ /2ξ * 1 (γ * )) 2 . Remark: If a demand is placed at location x, then from (12) we note that τ + 2 x is the average time the agent has to wait before he can place another demand in S. This is the source of the spatio-temporal dependence between the location and the rate of demands, and not surprisingly, it is reflected on the shape of the optimal spatial density ϕ * .
C. Equilibrium System Time (Value of the game)
If the physical constraint imposed by the agent carrying and placing the targets on S were removed and the rate were fixed, then the distribution that attains the maximum system time as λ/v → ∞ is uniform; this was proved in [2] . However, when the spatio-temporal dependence is introduced, a uniform distribution will induce a rate that is smaller than λ ϕ * . This is because ϕ * is more concentrated around the depot location than a uniform spatial density and hence the agent has to travel less distance on average between placement of successive targets. Figure 1 shows the ratio between T * := T (π * , ϕ * ) and T U := T (π * , ϕ uniform ) for S r = {x ∈ R 2 : x ≤ r} and τ = 0.1. As it can be seen, ϕ * yields 20% higher system time for r as small as 1.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
We studied a zero-sum game theoretic formulation of a dynamic vehicle routing problem where demands are strategically placed in a bounded region S by an agent with unitary capacity operating from a depot. We showed that in heavy load an equilibrium is given by the pair of a TSP-based routing policy and a unique power-law spatial density centered at the depot location. While the TSP based routing policy and its performance analysis has been adopted from [2] , [11] , the characterization of the optimal spatial density was rigorously derived using tools from conjugate duality and results concerning the maximization of concave integral functionals subject to linear equality constraints. Remarkably, all the results obtained hold for any bounded region S with a sufficiently smooth boundary, in particular for non-connected regions, allowing the introduction of support constraints. Also note that since lower bounds for the average system time for dynamic vehicle routing under heavy load often take the form of concave integral functionals, the convex analytic approach applied in this paper could be used more generally to formally analyze the performance of policies under worst case scenarios. It would be interesting to incorporate the estimation of ϕ * into the problem. Such a setup could also provide a natural framework for the formal study of geographic profiling [13] , where the objective is to determine the most probable area of a predator's hideout ("anchor point") based on observed attack locations.
